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Keeping Communism Down on the Farm
The Brazilian Rural Labor
Movement during the Cold War
by
Cliff Welch
Drawing on primary and secondary sources, this article discusses the
durability of communist ideology in rural Brazil during the second half of the
twentieth century. It analyzes the theme in two major periods: the Populist
Republic (1945–1964) and the Military Regime (1964–1985). Concluding with
a discussion of the first years of the New Republic, it argues that the politi-
cal mobilization of Brazilian peasants defied the geopolitical logic of the era,
which dictated the elimination of communist thought by the conclusion of the
cold war.
Keywords: Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), labor unions, rural social move-
ments, Brazil, history, post–World War II, Movimento dos Sem-Terra
(MST)
Whenever they acted openly, the communists of Brazil could almost
always count on a stern response from authorities, and in this environment
they rose like the phoenix. As in many Latin American countries, they
resisted the boot, bounced back, and managed to seize the agenda from time
to time. By struggling against cold-war logic, activists from the Partido
Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist party—PCB) and its offspring
opened space for communism and social-justice causes such as improved
working conditions and enhanced power for working people and their orga-
nizations. Though warned by priests and politicians to fear communists,
many workers and peasants sympathized with them because they promised
a life better than the one capitalist landlords, merchants, and financiers
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provided: the known world of endless work, valueless money, and profound
indignity, a world where subservience alone paved the way to advancement.
Communist ideas resonated with rural workers and proved useful at times
to the ruling class. Some of these ideas were no more radical than unioniza-
tion and land possession, but in the Brazilian context, where free workers
had replaced enslaved Africans only three generations before the start of the
cold war, such ideas had a cutting edge. “Down” (repressed yet resilient)
together in defiance of the “free world,” communists and rural workers
helped build one of the world’s largest rural labor organizations and most
aggressive contemporary peasant movements.
The story of Brazil’s passage through the cold war can be divided into
two periods. Many historians call the years from 1945 to 1964 the Populist
Republic because electoral democracy was restored after the war and the fran-
chise expanded to such an extent that the political elite had to form platforms
with mass appeal in order to get elected. Eventually, these appeals included the
extension of labor law to rural workers and land reform. The second period
began in 1964, when the ruling class conspired with the military to end the
populist era and install authoritarian rule with sharply curtailed civil rights,
severely interfering with the rural labor movement. The period of military rule
came to a gradual end with the seating of a civilian president and the begin-
ning of the “New Republic” in 1985. Ironically, just as worldwide cold-war
tensions were peaking, Brazil’s cold war can be said to have ended with the
restoration of the PCB’s legal status. While the party formally changed its
name after the collapse of the USSR, abandoning its identification with inter-
national communism, in the countryside PCB dissidents as well as other com-
munist parties, communist symbols, and Marxist-Leninist ideology became
more of a presence than ever after the military ceded power.1
THE POPULIST REPUBLIC (1945–1964)
The cold war came to Brazil in 1947. In May, soon after the Truman
Doctrine was pronounced, President Eurico Gaspar Dutra banned the PCB.
From an international perspective, Dutra, a general with close ties to the U.S.
military, sought to satisfy the U.S. desire for containing communism, but he
also had national concerns. The party’s candidates had done well in the elec-
tions of 1945 and 1947, and crucial municipal elections were coming up
in November. Campaigning openly after the war, the PCB found support
in the countryside as well as the city. Its newspapers trumpeted the cause
of camponeses and it organized dozens of “peasant leagues,” uniting disgrun-
tled small farmers like João Guerreiro Filho of Dumont, São Paulo, in rural
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communities touched by agro-industrial development. While Dutra’s clamp-
down forced the disbanding of these leagues and drove the party underground,
party militants continued to function into the 1960s, with some leaders achiev-
ing political influence. Party pressure helped push the government away from
ready compliance with U.S. priorities and created space for cross-class
alliances (Dulles, 1967: 284–287; Rodrigues, 1986: 409–412; Faleiros,
1989:116; Medeiros, 1995: 76–78; Welch, 1999: 102–107; Silva, 2003).
Following the party’s suppression in 1947, communist leaders adopted a
revolutionary line that was shaped, as was the anticommunism of Brazilian
officials, by cold-war pressures. Embracing the Comintern analysis of colo-
nialism, PCB theorists considered Brazil in a semicolonial relationship with
so-called imperialist powers, especially the USSR’s archenemy, the United
States. This analysis held that the imperialists and their Brazilian collabora-
tors, such as big coffee planters and beef exporters, were interested only in
the production of export commodities and strategic resources like oil. In order
to protect their interests, they and their collaborators conspired to hold the
agricultural sector in a backward state of development bordering on feudal-
ism. To improve the lot of the working classes, Brazil would have to break its
ties with the imperialists and restructure agriculture to favor production of
foodstuffs for the home market—foodstuffs essential for feeding urban work-
ers engaged in the industrial development of Brazil. Once capitalism had
been firmly established, the proletariat would arise in the struggle for social-
ism. Forced underground by President Dutra, the party chose to fight force
with force. “The masses want to struggle,” declared Communist party leader
Luis Carlos Prestes in January 1948. “They have already demonstrated,” he
continued, “that they simply await direction from the Communists to con-
front police violence with decisiveness and courage” (Prestes, 1948: 36).
On August 1, 1950, in what became known as the August Manifesto,
Prestes called upon party activists to struggle for the violent overthrow of the
government and the establishment of a popular revolutionary state. Framed
by cold-war concerns, the statement guided party militants into the mid-
1950s. Prestes condemned the “servile” Brazilian government for support-
ing the United States by signing military pacts and providing oil, coffee,
and other products to allied troops in the unfolding Korean War. Only by
standing with the Soviet Union, he argued, could Brazil restore its tradition
of peace, independence, and progress. To reverse the “reactionary fascist
advance” of the country, “it was indispensable to liquidate the economic
bases of the reaction [by] confiscating the great landholdings (latifundios),
which should be given freely into the hands of those who work and live on
the properties.” Prestes called for peasants and agricultural laborers to rise
up and fight for land seizures without compensation to latifundiários, the
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end of sharecropping arrangements, wage payments in money rather than
in kind, and the elimination of all debts. Finally, the manifesto called for the
creation of a “popular army of national liberation” to free the nation from
the imperialist grip of the United States and its Brazilian collaborators
(Prestes, 1982; Loner, 1985: 68–76).
The first test of the party’s commitment to revolutionary struggle and
radical agrarian change came in northern Paraná. Contemporary press
reports called it the “War of Porecatú,” acknowledging the town of Porecatú
as the hub of the conflict. The communist-inspired combatants thought of
it as a little Korea (Coreinha), making reference to the cold-war clash in
Asia. In any event, the conflict of peasants, landlords, and the state attained
military proportions, including several pitched battles between soldiers and
peasants and at least 14 deaths and 18 casualties, before the fighting ceased
on June 21, 1951. Having squeezed the peasants into its theoretical frame-
work, the party did not stand by the popular peasant army when the state
police of Paraná and São Paulo amassed to crush the rebellion. Facing
defeat, the PCB abandoned the fight and reconsidered its revolutionary line
(Welch, 1999: 133–144; Priori, 2000).
A big problem for the party in 1951 was the election of Brazilian Labor
party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB) candidate Getúlio Vargas as pres-
ident. Despite many contradictions, the adept politician successfully pre-
sented himself as the workers’ candidate. Though Prestes lambasted Vargas
as a “feudal lord,” most voters accepted him as the “father of the poor.” As
president and dictator from 1930 to 1945, Vargas used corporatism to bal-
ance the boot of order with the sandal of progress through minimum wages
and protective social legislation such as legalized unions and social security
benefits. The party pushed Vargas to stand up against the “imperialists,” and
now and then he did. A case in point was the nationalization of Brazilian oil.
The PCB started the campaign in 1951, but Vargas finished it in 1953 by
establishing a state oil monopoly (Wirth, 1970: 189–206). On the issue of
rural labor, Vargas was articulate but ineffective, and therefore the PCB had
more room to maneuver. As part of his economic development program,
Vargas exploited coffee export earnings through taxation and the manipula-
tion of foreign exchange rates. While this irritated coffee planters, they were
able to protect their profits by reducing their labor costs through increased
exploitation and the withdrawal of privileges such as free worker housing.
As conditions in the agricultural sector went into decline, PCB militants agi-
tated among rural workers, hoping to build a following for radical change
and provoke government action (Welch, 1999: 158–168).
The activities of communist militants soon came to the attention of
President Vargas. In September 1952, Vargas’s labor minister, José de Segades
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Vianna, reported that spies had secured a secret PCB memorandum on the
distribution and discussion of a Prestes communiqué in São Paulo. The docu-
ment revealed the government’s concern that communist rural labor militants
had succeeded in meeting with “several hundred peasants” in the interior.
Vianna’s memo contrasted these rural successes with an anecdote about an
industrial city on the outskirts of the capital where communist activists had
reportedly failed to unite any workers at all. The minister emphasized the
“threat of communist infiltration of the rural masses” and asked the president
to instruct PTB leaders to promote worker marches and other popular mani-
festations to build support for the improvement of agricultural working condi-
tions and living standards (Novaes e Cruz, 1983: 202–205).
Throughout 1952, Vargas spoke about the need to improve the lot of rural
workers. In April he addressed the fifth conference of the American member
nations of the International Labor Organization in Rio de Janeiro, convened
to establish international rural labor law standards and to debate the problem
of implementing them; in June he sent a proposal to establish the Rural
Social Service agency to Congress. As PCB-directed agitation increased,
Vargas replaced Vianna with the more radical João Goulart, who revealed
plans to establish a process for legalizing rural labor unions. In January 1954
one of Goulart’s subordinates announced that the unionization of rural labor-
ers would begin immediately in São Paulo, “seeking to neutralize commu-
nist influence and bring under government control all the farmers’
representative organizations.” They set a goal of founding 250 rural labor
unions in the state, with plans to begin in the areas where communists had
been active (Camargo, 1986: 148–151; Welch, 1999: 183–187).
Rural unionization became the focus of intense debate in the aftermath of
these announcements. On one side, planters and beef producers associated
with the Sociedade Rural Brasileira (Brazilian Rural Society—SRB) called
the plan a thinly veiled scheme for the “regimentation of force for the triumph
of a future unionist republic or perhaps even a Soviet republic.” On the other,
PCB bulletins challenged Vargas to put the law into effect. In the end, Vargas
appeased the planters by firing Goulart. Frustrated and plagued by scandal,
Vargas committed suicide in August 1954. The communists capitalized on his
death by cynically assuming the mantle of the “father of the poor,” calling
on the masses to support them in championing rural labor rights and the rest
of Vargas’s unfinished agenda. In September they hosted a congress of rural
worker and peasant delegates from associations organized by militants around
the country. The congress founded the União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores
Agrícolas do Brasil (Farmers’ and Agricultural Laborers’ Union of Brazil—
ULTAB), which became the main tool for advancing the rural labor struggle.
The creation of ULTAB demonstrated that the PCB had abandoned the August
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Manifesto and adopted an alliance-building, peaceful-transition perspective.
This ideological transition came well before the USSR formally advocated
similar positions in 1956. It was rewarded with semilegality in 1958 (Welch,
1999: 190–199; Mazzeo, 1999; Gaspari, 2002a: 180; Cunha, 2004).
In the late 1950s a group of peasants and tenant farmers in Pernambuco
persuaded the state government to take their side in a dispute with the land-
lord by expropriating an unproductive sugar mill and its lands. The charis-
matic lawyer Francisco Julião had organized the rural laborers into a peasant
league like those organized by the PCB after the war. The expropriation and
clear communist involvement caused the Catholic Church to step up its own
version of a cold war with communism. United by anticommunism, Catholics
were divided in their hostile attitude toward the leagues and ULTAB and their
commitment to unionization. A progressive wing saw unionization as the best
way to fight communist appeal while conservatives favored private-sector
paternalism—convincing landlords that it was in their best interest to treat
workers compassionately. Thereafter, more and more politicians found that
rural labor advocacy resonated with their constituents and made the legaliza-
tion of rural unions and land reform part of their platforms. Since the 1946
constitution advocated unionization and privileged “social utility” over own-
ership in the determination of landholding rights, all factions could make a
legitimate case for semicommunist solutions to rural land and labor problems
(Callado, 1980; Bastos, 1984; Azevêdo, 1982; Pereira, 1997; Novaes, 1997).
Indeed, even the international context had changed with the victory of Fidel
Castro’s revolutionaries in Cuba at the beginning of 1959. Anxious to forestall
more Cuba-like revolutions in the hemisphere, the U.S. government became
an advocate of demonstration reform efforts. By the early 1960s the PCB was
no longer alone in seeking to welcome rural workers’participation and resolve
their concerns. Under Prestes, the party adhered to the mass-mobilization and
popular-front models now supported by the USSR, but, in the wake of the
Cuban Revolution, reflecting the breakdown in the international communist
order that China’s 1949 revolution had begun to express, dissidents appeared
to challenge Moscow’s guidance. One of these was Julião, who was befriended
by Castro in Havana in the early 1960s and came to reject the popular-front
strategy. Another was the Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of
Brazil—PCdoB), which was formed in 1962 by three former PCB central
committee members and looked to China for models to hasten the transition
to socialism through insurrection. While these groups concerned the authori-
ties and fed ammunition to right-wing cold warriors, they had little social sig-
nificance as protagonists of radical change (Camargo, 1986: 144–150;
Gaspari, 2002a: 174–182). In the meantime, the PCB line of cooperation with
the reformist “national bourgeoisie” became a mainstream movement.
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With former labor minister Goulart now serving as president, the debate
shifted from whether agrarian reform and rural unionization should exist to
who would control the process and the unions once formed. The Catholics
got the upper hand when the leader of the Christian Democratic party, André
Franco Montoro, became labor minister for a brief period. Montoro put into
effect the first federal regulations for the legal formation of rural unions. Even
though ULTAB president Lindolfo Silva urged the minister to recognize all
“rural unions without discrimination on the basis of ideology, politics, or reli-
gion,” Montoro’s ministry recognized 11 rural unions in the state of São
Paulo alone, nearly all of them organized by José Rotta, head of the church’s
conservative, harmony-oriented wing. So long as Montoro controlled the
ministry, church-linked organizations stood the best chance of being recog-
nized by the government (Barros, 1986: 114-116; Welch, 1999: 257–281).
But in July Montoro was out and Goulart confidant João Pinheiro Neto was
in. Pinheiro Neto believed the PCB to be an important and useful ally in
Goulart’s drive to make structural reforms that would ultimately reduce the
mass appeal of revolutionary rhetoric. In November he issued new rural union
formation regulations, replacing those of his predecessor with rules that both
progressive Catholics and communists found easier to implement. Under these
rules more than 100 unions were quickly recognized nationally, with 20 added
to the rolls in São Paulo alone. To hasten the pace of what were then called
“basic reforms,” Goulart asked Congress to create the Superintendência da
Política Agrária (Superintendency of Agrarian Policy—SUPRA). The SRB
warned planters that the “most important and dangerous” aspect of SUPRA
was its duty to encourage “social equality” by “promoting the just distribution
of property, tying its use to the social welfare.” Indeed, Goulart directed
SUPRA to encourage the growth of peasant associations and rural labor
unions, groups he hoped to use to build support for a broader reform package.
Finally, in June 1963 the long-awaited Rural Laborer Statute became law, cre-
ating a comprehensive labor code for agriculture. When Goulart appointed
Pinheiro Neto head of SUPRA, the agency became responsible for imple-
menting the law (Kornis and Soares, 1984; Medeiros and Araújo, 1984;
Barros, 1986: 158–165; Pinheiro Neto, 1993).
The statute called for a national rural labor confederation, something like
an AFL-CIO of rural workers, that was to be called the Confederação Nacional
de Trabalhadores na Agricultura (National Confederation of Laborers in
Agriculture—CONTAG). The chance to be associated with a recognized,
national, representative rural labor body was of intense interest to all those
engaged in rural labor politics and organizing. To form it they needed at least
three state federations, and to found these federations they needed at least
five recognized unions in each state. Hardball politics generally characterized
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disputes between Catholics and communists as they positioned themselves to
gain control of CONTAG. Seeing the dispute in cold-war terms, the United
States encouraged the rivalry. The worst area for this was in the Northeast,
where the popularity and radicalism of Julião’s peasant leagues and the
exceptional growth of ULTAB-oriented sugar worker unions motivated the
United States to establish one of the first Alliance for Progress programs.
Under the Alliance umbrella numerous cold-war agencies went to work in the
region, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the American Institute for
Free Labor Development (AIFLD), and the Food for Peace program. To off-
set the appeal of the leagues, the United States funneled money to church
groups, especially the Serviço de Orientação Rural de Pernambuco (Rural
Orientation Service of Pernambuco—SORPE), which was headed by Father
Paulo Crespo. In São Paulo, the AIFLD- and CIA-financed Instituto Cultural
de Trabalho (Cultural Institute of Labor—ICT) sponsored various projects,
including training for Rotta and a Food for Peace project which, according to
U.S. documents, “helped the [rural labor] union in its organizing efforts”
(Page, 1972: 129–134; Bandeira, 1983: 70; Welch, 1999: 319).
Soon after Pinheiro Neto took control of SUPRA, U.S. Labor Attaché
John Fishburn pressured him to favor Catholic over communist unions in the
official recognition process. According to Fishburn’s report of their meeting,
Pinheiro Neto at first told him that SUPRA funds “would be made available
to all who request them,” that he planned to “recognize all unions organized
by the communists or by the church,” and that his office could “make no dis-
tinctions” between them. But Fishburn made his displeasure with this answer
known, and by the end of the meeting Pinheiro Neto had “changed his stand
and stated that while he would recognize rural unions by whomever orga-
nized, he would withhold funds if it were clear that those requesting them
were communists.” Nevertheless, Fishburn doubted the sincerity of Pinheiro
Neto’s anticommunism and did what he could to strengthen the church-
oriented movement. It was a frustrating business, though. For the United
States, the church’s movement was too diffuse and weak to challenge the Red
Menace (Welch, 1999: 319–322).
When CONTAG’s founding convention finally took place, nearly 30
federations from at least 19 states sent delegates. Although it is unclear how
many of these federations belonged to ULTAB, two-thirds of them were
later declared “ghost federations” by the military regime that overthrew
Goulart. Official records have not yet surfaced, so it is difficult to document
these developments. But it is important to note that in São Paulo and other
states the PCB had long been active in supporting groups of tenants and
sharecroppers who were highly exploited by landlords. In other words, though
some federations may have been hastily formed, the PCB-linked workers’
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movement had a substantial history in São Paulo and, for that matter, in
Paraná, where participants in the Porecatú War had joined with other disgrun-
tled squatters to form another federation. In fact, the labor minister’s guide-
lines for the formation of federations were purposefully made easy in order
to “enlarge the composition of CONTAG,” the PCB’s Terra Livre reported.
Given the spread and duration of ULTAB’s investment in the rural labor
movement, it was no surprise that they were able to take advantage of these
new rules by quickly founding numerous organizations. Indeed, Fishburn’s
concerns about the influence of communists proved well-founded, for party
members came out on top by the conclusion of the CONTAG conference.
The PCB’s Lindolpho Silva, for example, became CONTAG’s first presi-
dent (CONTAG, 1993: 10; Coletti, 1998: 65–68; Welch, 1999: 322–328;
Silva, 2003; Cunha 2004).
In 1964 the PCB enjoyed increased access to the Goulart administration,
feeding the fears of Goulart’s anticommunist opponents. In a dramatic
March 13 speech, Goulart attacked aspects of the Brazilian constitution,
claiming that it legalized an “unjust and inhumane socioeconomic structure”
and insisting on its amendment. Standing at his side were the communist
rural labor spokesman Lindolpho Silva and Luís Tenório da Lima, a state
legislator who headed the food workers’ union. For some, their presence
added an ominous note to the president’s announced intention to fight for the
elimination of constitutional language that required the government to pay
cash for expropriated land. “The use of land is conditioned by the well-being
of society,” Goulart announced. “No one has the right to hold land without
using it just by virtue of the concept of ‘property rights.’” Before a cheering
crowd, he reported having just signed the much-anticipated decree ordering
SUPRA to confiscate latifundios from a 10-kilometer band along trans-
portation right-of-ways for distribution to landless rural laborers. (In his
memoirs, Pinheiro Neto revealed that, in a prior meeting with Luis Carlos
Prestes to refine this very proposal, the PCB leader had urged a more cau-
tious approach.) Moreover, Goulart promised to send an agrarian reform bill
to Congress fundamentally redirecting agricultural production away from
export commodities and toward the cultivation of food crops for internal
consumption. Finally, he called for the legalization of the Communist party
and promised to reform the electoral code by eliminating literacy require-
ments (Dulles, 1967: 269–272; Bandeira, 1983: 163–165; Moraes, 1989:
264–265; Castello Branco, 1975: 262–266; Pinheiro Neto, 1993: 187–202).
While supporters of radical agrarian reform cheered the president, the
March 13 rally and speech offered Goulart’s detractors the symbolic and emo-
tional material they needed to launch their attack on the administration. Coffee
planters and beef producers organized in the SRB maintained that rural
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workers were uneducated, illiterate, and ill-prepared to run their own unions.
Rural workers were so indiscriminate in their choice of leaders, they argued,
that unions would simply serve the purpose of giving communists an oppor-
tunity to generate class struggle, promote “rural anarchy,” and create a state
of chaos out of which power could quickly be seized. Since the beginning
of his administration, SRB leaders had plotted with other ruling-class insti-
tutions and the military to weaken and oust Goulart. The conspirators were
frequent callers at the U.S. embassy, where Ambassador Lincoln Gordon had
drawn up a “contingency plan” outlining U.S. support for a Brazilian coup
d’état as early as December. But Goulart’s speech seems to have tipped the
balance in favor of those who urged immediate action, and the coup d’état
began on March 31. Fearing a civil war, Goulart and his supporters offered
little resistance, and the conspirators took control within 24 hours (Mourão
Filho, 1978; Welch, 1995).
Given its radical agenda and close association with the communist-
influenced rural labor movement, SUPRA was an early target for attack.
Police invaded its offices, interrogated its staff, and confiscated everything.
The new regime used the documents taken from SUPRA offices to discredit
the agency and the rural labor movement in the press; officials also used
them to initiate a criminal indictment against the agency and its staff. All
involved were accused of subversion under the national security law, and
for eight years the military government hounded them (D’Aguiar, 1976;
Mourão Filho, 1978). The regime repudiated SUPRA and then repudiated
the system that gave birth to it. Standing against a system that extended
back 30 years to the time of Vargas, officials characterized themselves as
revolutionaries. Victorious on the field of battle, they seized power deter-
mined to establish a system that would protect their property and privileges.
A study of rural politics during the populist era shows that the cold war had
to do more with control than with ideology, for the conspirators’ first con-
cern was neither capitalism nor democracy but the occupation of state agen-
cies that threatened their interests.
UNDER MILITARY RULE (1964–1985)
Brazilians like to emphasize the nonviolent nature of their political
history. From the conquest through independence and abolition to the cold
war, there have been no prolonged civil wars in Brazil. The ruling class
sometimes takes credit for this by arguing that its sense of grace arises from
a European cultural inheritance, but its role has largely been one of main-
taining control through discreet acts of violence and a cruel paternalism.
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(Its remarkable ability to dominate millions of enslaved Africans for 350 years
is one proof, as is the country’s persistent contemporary ranking as among
the worst in income distribution.) Thus, while the 1964 coup took but a few
days and little bloodletting, the campaign to restore the predominance of
Brazil’s ruling class—a position uncharacteristically weakened in the pre-
ceding era—lasted years, cost thousands of lives, and remained incomplete
by the time the armed forces relinquished power in 1985.
In the cold-war climate of the 1960s, the United States did not hesitate to
recognize Brazil’s military rulers. The coup was an early test of the Kennedy-
Johnson administration’s commitment to democracy, and the administration
failed. It covered up its hypocrisy by introducing the Mann Doctrine. Under
the doctrine, the United States signaled its willingness to accept the over-
throw of democratic constitutional governments that failed to conform to U.S.
containment policy (Parker, 1979: 59–61). The Goulart administration had
behaved improperly by letting communists dominate CONTAG, expropriat-
ing land, and threatening to legalize the PCB. This is not to say that the
United States made the coup happen—Brazil’s landed, financial, and military
rulers drove the overthrow—but the government’s frustrations with Goulart
and its anticommunist priorities (not to mention direct military and planning
support) made it clear that the United States would welcome a coup.
In the aftermath of the coup, the United States denied knowledge of
wrongdoing on the part of Brazil’s new generals in command. Yet a stream
of reports, worsening as hard-line military personnel took the initiative
from 1965 on, revealed the regime’s systematic and violent persecution of
thousands of dissident military officials, communists, progressive Catholics,
peasant league activists, rural and urban labor militants, and even moderate
and conservative critics of the regime. Claiming that their prisoners held
secret information about an international communist conspiracy to take
over Brazil, the police subjected hundreds to an array of barbaric tortures:
the “telephone” (slapping the ears until the eardrums burst), the “Chinese
bath” (nearly drowning the victim in sewage), and the “parrot’s perch”
(prodding, pounding, and electrocuting a victim hung in a tied knot from a
pole), to name but a few examples. The regime found just enough evidence
of a plot in the machinations of Cuban and Chinese-linked conspirators to
intensify the terror campaign into the 1970s. In the name of freedom, the
United States invested millions of dollars in police and counterinsurgency
training through the Office of Public Safety, eventually supporting a secu-
rity privatization process that continues to reinforce the repressive appara-
tus of both the government and the private sector (Skidmore, 1988: 23–27;
Huggins, 1998; Gaspari, 2002a). As elsewhere, the cold war excused terror
in Brazil.
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Although urban guerrillas such as PCB dissident Carlos Marighella
received considerable attention, rural labor activists also suffered dramatically
under military rule. A careful study published in 1987 confirmed the murder
of 1,149 rural workers between 1964 and 1986, some, such as Nestor Vera,
known communist militants and others of unknown ideological or organiza-
tional leanings (MST, 1986). Disappearing and killing nonactivists as well as
activists functioned to intensify the intimidation. The terrorism persisted in the
day-to-day existence of workers through common knowledge of the perpetra-
tor’s impunity, for prosecution of the killers was rare and conviction nonexis-
tent. Thus, the shadow of unpunished murder hung over the countryside, a
shadow cast over another form of terror: the intimidating hunger, poverty, and
chronic illness that plagued an ever-growing number of migrant rural workers.
The 1960s and 1970s were bad years for peasants and farm workers.
The first years of the coup left rural workers without institutional support.
Many of the unions that SUPRA officials created in the first trimester of 1964
were denied recognition by the military and dismantled. All of CONTAG’s
officers were judged subversives, and all but 6 of the 29 state federations that
had founded the confederation were eventually ruled “phantom” organizations
and erased from the labor ministry register. Within a year, the regime shut down
2,381 rural labor unions for the same reason, leaving the country with about
490 functioning unions in August 1965 (Medeiros, 1989: 92–95; Welch, 1999;
343–344; Ricci, 1999: 51–52, 111). The regime imprisoned or forced into
hiding or exile the people who had led the now-closed organizations. While
Francisco Julião was hunted down, jailed, and exiled, Lindolpho Silva, Nester
Vera, and Luíz Tenório de Lima initially escaped capture by going under-
ground. The regime ended the political rights of these men and many more.
In April 1964, João Pinheiro Neto was replaced by Colonel Vital Queirós
and eventually arrested as one of 102 “enemies of the state” under the first of
what would become a series of five “institutional acts,” unappealable execu-
tive orders that abrogated the constitution. One of Queirós’s first acts was
to rescind Goulart’s right-of-way expropriation decree of March 13. In
November, SUPRA was transformed into two new agencies, the Instituto
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Agrário (National Institute of Agrarian
Development—INDA) and the Instituto Brasileiro de Reforma Agrária
(Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform—IBRA), neither of which promoted
rural unionization. Under the Land Statute, the Instituto Nacional de
Colonização e Reforma Agrária (National Institute for Colonization and
Agrarian Reform—INCRA)—which eventually replaced the IBRA and the
INDA—encouraged the colonization of lands far in the interior. Here began
official support for the migration and settlement that would eventually be
blamed for engendering ecological disaster and human tragedy in the Amazon
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Basin (Ianni, 1978; Borges, 1984; Kornis and Soares, 1984; Medeiros and
Araújo, 1984).
Despite the crackdown on CONTAG and the dismantling of SUPRA, the
military regime let stand the much-maligned rural unionization law of 1963.
In its view, the rural labor union structure could help achieve greater pro-
ductivity by containing strikes, channeling complaints through the courts,
training workers to operate machinery, and dispensing social services—a
policy known as assistencialismo—that could ameliorate some of the worst
abuses of the transition from an agricultural sector dependent on manual
labor to one dependent on machine power (Maybury-Lewis, 1994). This
intensification of agricultural productivity was coupled with a process
of extending Brazil’s agricultural frontiers—into the Amazon region, for
example—that together displaced millions of rural workers, smallholders,
and squatters, forcing them into an oversaturated urban labor market
(Martine, 1987). In February 1965, the labor minister Arnaldo Sussekind, a
long-time informant to U.S. labor attachés, reformed the law to eliminate the
five categories of rural professional activity that had earlier been established.
This forced workers with different problems and perspectives—wage work-
ers and small farmers, for instance—to join together in a single territorially
based union, pitting workers with different interests against one another and
causing untold internal problems for the labor movement.
The reformed rural labor system needed a reliable leader, and the military
found its man in the Catholic layman José Rotta, who continued to receive
training and financing from the United States. The regime appointed him to
serve as trustee of the leaderless CONTAG. In April 1965 Sussekind allowed
Rotta to engineer his transition to elected president of the confederation.
Even though only 11 recognized state federations could participate, Rotta
ensured the absence of distrusted delegates by waiting to inform them of the
meeting until it was too late for them to reach it. Through this intrigue, he
excluded delegates from the moderate Catholic federations of Rio Grande do
Sul, Minas Gerais, Bahia, and Ceará and bought himself two years as pres-
ident of CONTAG. Under his rule, the infant rural labor movement barely
managed to crawl. Local union leaders became disgusted with the confeder-
ation and broke their ties with it until moderates and progressives mounted
a campaign to vote Rotta out of office. In the 1967 election, Rotta was
defeated by a slate led by the Pernambuco state federation leader, José
Francisco da Silva. From then on CONTAG gradually grew in strength, and
the union and federation structure became more meaningful to members
(Ricci, 1999: 89–106; Welch, 1999: 347–348).
Many were later surprised to learn how Silva worked with communists.
This was one of the ways the party stayed in the game. The military regime
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that followed the Populist Republic greatly complicated life for the PCB.
Many people on the left became frustrated with the party’s search for nonvio-
lent means of bringing about change, including the infiltration of organizations
such as CONTAG. In the increasingly polarized postcoup era, the activism and
influence of dissidents grew as the left fragmented into splinter groups, many
dedicated to armed struggle. A notable example is the PCdoB. A band of
nearly 70 militants withdrew to the Araguaia River basin to recuperate and
train militants as well as build support for an insurrection among peasants. As
a strategy for change, the guerrilla base in Araguaia failed miserably—in three
operations between 1972 and 1974, the military exterminated the group, mur-
dering all but the few militants who escaped capture (Gaspari, 2002b: 399–464;
Portela, 2002). The PCdoB tried to defend and expand its militancy in the
region with the August 1973 publication of a “proclamation” on the “liberty
and rights of the people.” Generated through discussions with peasants in the
region but written largely by São Paulo–based intellectuals, it began by prior-
itizing land questions and demanding land titles for peasant squatters, prose-
cution of land-grabbers (grileiros), and support such as price controls for small
farmers; additional points called for improved rural working conditions and
infrastructure improvements, including the construction of schools, clinics,
and soccer fields (Portela, 2002: 239–243).
Looking back, it is difficult to imagine how such moderate demands
could have been seen as revolutionary. Taken in cold-war context, the brutal
assaults of the military in Araguaia—the regime expected “liquidation” of
the guerrillas (Gaspari, 2002b: 402–404)—made sense only as a response
bent on centralizing control, for INCRA simultaneously pursued similar
development policies in other regions (Velho, 1972). Ironically, the govern-
ment’s reaction to the communist action stimulated responses in other sec-
tors that promoted the resilience of communism in the Brazilian countryside.
With the Araguaia guerrillas repressed, a new phase in the history of the
two main factions of Brazilian communism began to take shape. As men-
tioned above, the influence of the PCB filtered down through the organized
rural labor movement; in the meantime, the PCdoB’s influence reemerged
through the work of communism’s most traditional adversary, the Roman
Catholic Church. While the influences on the church were diverse, a straight
line connects the “little Araguaia war” with the formation of the Comissão
Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Land Commission—CPT), an agency dedicated to
helping rural laborers and peasants that the Catholic and Lutheran churches
founded in 1975. The Araguaia region represented the cutting edge of a
painful development process carved out by the military government, one that
inspired the activism not only of the PCdoB guerrillas but also of the Catholic
Church. At the same time, the military regime’s broad definition of “enemies
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of the state” included secular and lay church men and women. As repression
of the guerrillas sought first to neutralize their support among peasants
through acts of intimidation, priests who had made “an option for the poor”
saw themselves and their followers treated as if they were communists. Out
of this cauldron came one of the first signs of the church’s future commitment
to the rural poor (Indians, peasants, and rural laborers): a 1974 protest letter
from the region’s bishop, Pedro Casaldáliga, calling on the church to defend
the rural laboring classes. Uniting bishops from the region, the Pastoral
Meeting of the Amazon held in Goiânia, Góias, founded the CPT. In January
2004, the CPT cofounder and coordinator Antônio Canuto told me that “the
anticommunism of the military defined us as communists, and we saw our
work in that light.” The explicitly class-conscious documents, the Marxist
readings distributed to peasants, and the revival of radical agrarian reform in
the years that followed point to the perseverance of grassroots communism in
the countryside during the military regime (Poletto and Canuto, 2002).
The CPT emerged in the context of broader changes signaling the collapse
of Brazil’s cold-war regime. Everywhere the military turned to claim legiti-
macy as a representation of the popular will, it met with reproval. In the world
of soccer, which was explicitly supported by the military as a tranquilizer of
the masses, the 1970 World Cup champions placed a sorry fourth in 1974
(Lever, 1983). Later that year, in an overwhelming majority of state legislative
elections, the military lost control to the one “opposition” party allowed to
exist. Meanwhile, a 35 percent hike in prices consumed the increased earnings
a fragment of the working class had gained during the “economic miracle” of
the early 1970s and labor unrest began to grow (Gaspari, 2003; Pomar, 2004).
A “new unionism” emphasizing grassroots mobilization gradually shattered
the labor peace the military had constructed through increased wages, co-optation
of union leaders, assistencialismo, and outright coercion. In 1979 the new union-
ists joined with other radical opponents of the regime such as CPT activists to
challenge the regime with a new political party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores
(Workers’ party—PT). The new unionists challenged union bosses who had
collaborated with the regime, and in 1983 enough “new unions” existed to
found an extralegal but tolerated national labor body called the Central Única
dos Trabalhadores (Unified Laborers’ Central—CUT). These new organiza-
tions—the CPT, the PT, and the CUT—took the initiative in pushing the tran-
sition from military to civilian rule (Keck, 1992; Maria Helena Moreira Alves,
interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 27, 2004).
In the agricultural sector, the PCB and PCdoB worked behind the scenes
to strengthen CONTAG, enhance the social services of the unions, and even-
tually organize strikes. The first mass mobilization came in 1979, when 20,000
sugarcane cutters in Pernambuco went on strike. Hundreds of thousands of
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sugar workers in the region joined them over the course of the next few
years. These strikes as well as elections increasingly won by opposition can-
didates were carefully orchestrated to adhere to the strict rules established
for union activism by the regime so as to avoid a repressive backlash. PCB
militants excelled in this realm: through CONTAG and other standing
organizations, they worked to win benefits at the outer edges of the system
(Siguad, 1980; Coletti, 1998: 161–187).
One big problem with this strategy was that a large portion of the wage-
earning rural labor force could not legally be unionized because of its status
as seasonal rather than full-time labor. This portion of the labor force grew
to become a majority, especially during the harvest season, when tens of
thousands of cane cutters descended on Brazil’s vast fields of sugarcane
ready to work (Siguad, 1979; D’Incao, 1975). Living at times in stalls barely
fit for horses, earning wages that hardly lasted the harvest season, and pres-
sured to produce more and more just to stay employed, these workers forced
a change in strategy in the early 1980s. In the sugar zones of São Paulo state,
the migrant workers found support in the CPT and developed a platform of
demands. Strikes of mass proportions exploded in the region on the eve of the
1984 harvest season. Taken by surprise, the labor-union bureaucracy of
CONTAG and the state federation at first tried to help authorities contain the
workers but soon found a way to ride the wave of popular discontent, help-
ing to shape historic labor agreements that improved conditions for all rural
workers and expanded union membership. In these struggles, former com-
munist militants like Irineu Luis de Moraes and “red diaper babies” like
union leader Elio Neves, whose father had been a PCB militant, played
important roles (Welch, 1999: 349–362; Penteado, 2000).
Another departure from the norms the military regime envisioned
became concrete in 1984 when the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais
Sem-Terra (Landless Rural Laborers’ Movement—MST) was founded.
This movement arose first from the demands for land of tens of thousands
of former peasants who had lost their farms to dam construction projects,
or the expansion of agro-industries, large-scale export farming, and cattle
ranching, from the desperate needs of migrant rural workers, many of
whom lived most of the year in slums on the margins of cities with no jobs
or income, and from the visionary direct-action strategies of CPT activists
like Father Arnildo Fritzen and dissident government workers like the econ-
omist João Pedro Stédile. As had the PCdoB militants who became part of
peasant communities in the Araguaia region in the late 1960s, MST-
activists-to-be encouraged the landless to help themselves and promoted
an anticapitalist view of communal farming. In 1979 they carried out their
first direct action by occupying lands of questionable title in the southern
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state of Rio Grande do Sul. The process of occupation, confrontation with
authorities, and eventual settlement that began there became the modus
operandi of MST organizing committees as they spread around the nation,
working to help hundreds of thousands of poor people establish themselves in
the countryside (Stédile and Fernandes, 1999; Fernandes, 2000; Branford and
Rocha, 2002; Wright and Wolford, 2003).
BRAZIL’S COLD WAR CONCLUDES
Slowly but surely, the cold war ended for Brazilians. Many rural labor
militants from the pre-1964 movement resurfaced in the final stages of the
military’s transitional process of gradual democratization called the “open-
ing” (abertura). A general amnesty in 1977 allowed former activists like
Lindolpho Silva and Francisco Julião to cautiously reenter political life. For
the first time since 1965, voters directly elected state governors in 1982,
and a handful of new political parties such as the PT replaced the rigid
bipartisan structure imposed by the regime. Mass rallies appealed for direct
election of the president, too, but the military resisted this demand and
scheduled an indirect election—votes cast by representatives in an electoral
college—for January 1985, after which the regime planned to withdraw
from power. The college overwhelmingly supported the opposition candi-
date, bringing Brazil its first civilian president in 21 years. But the winner,
former president Goulart’s prime minister from 1961, Tancredo Neves, died
suddenly before taking office, and the vice-presidential choice, the long-
time civilian collaborator of the regime José Sarney, became president. The
following year, all restrictions on political organization were lifted, and the
PCB and PCdoB came out into the open (Couto, 1999).
Although the country seemed on a “return to the future” path, profound
changes had occurred since 1964, and rural workers could have few nostal-
gic illusions about the New Republic. The military’s modernization project
affected rural workers and small farmers around the country. Colonization
moved peasants from the south to the north; demands for beef, orange juice,
and soybeans further concentrated landholding; subsidies for sugarcane-
alcohol production turned the central southern region into a gigantic cane
field; and subsidies for motorized farm equipment displaced thousands of
workers. The bulk of rural labor was now composed of migrant seasonal
workers; another group included small farmers. Inadequate financing and
market access perturbed the latter category, while forced migration, brutal
working conditions, and low wages caused severe problems for the former.
The situation created problems that demanded solutions, attracting numerous
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organizations, nearly all of them left-of-center, with perspectives at least as
radical as those of groups summarily suppressed during most of the cold war.
The theory, practice, and organization traditionally employed by commu-
nists gained renewed importance as the New Republic took shape. Analysts
agree that communists themselves were important to both the rural labor
movement, as represented by the giant, pseudo-governmental CONTAG,
and INCRA, the government’s lead executive agency for implementing
agrarian reform policy. “The conceptions of CONTAG were formulated by
aides who were PCB and MR-8 militants who privileged the rural prole-
tariat,” one observer concluded (Ricci, 1999: 160). “The majority of the
superintendents of INCRA were from the PCdoB and PCB,” said Stédile
(Stédile and Fernandes, 1999: 52). Indeed, the rural labor union confedera-
tion arose from the PCB-led rural labor movement, and the party’s main
strategy was to build alliances with whomever or whatever it considered
progressive in the established order, even in the context of military rule.
Thus, while the discourse of the military regime was fervently anticommu-
nist and the history of repression is well documented, both parties and the
militants who pursued a legalistic approach survived. In fact, CONTAG
saw its greatest growth during the military regime as president José
Francisco da Silva and his staff, many alleged communists, founded 1,206
new unions between 1971 and 1980. A leadership education program accom-
panied this campaign, and the number of rural workers organized increased
by millions, making CONTAG the largest rural labor-union movement in
the world (Ricci, 1999: 82–83). Following the restoration of civilian rule,
important agrarian reform officials such as Ivan de Otero Ribeiro and Raul
Jungmann came out of PCB ranks. Much like the ULTAB-SUPRA project of
the precoup period, the CONTAG-INCRA project of the 1980s was to unify
the entire rural labor movement under one organizational umbrella (Coletti,
1998: 163–169; Ricci, 1999: 171–205; Santos, 1996: 29–31; Mazzeo, 1999;
Branford and Rocha, 2002: 185–194).
While communist influence was concentrated in these official institutions,
communist ideology significantly impacted new social movement organiza-
tions like the CPT and the MST (Grzybowski, 1990: 35; Porto Gonçalves,
2005: 24). CPT activists participated in CONTAG congresses and infiltrated
rural labor unions. They saw the union structure as useful but in need of revi-
talization. The CPT, like the MST, opposed the centralizing ambitions of
CONTAG and INCRA and was determined to remain autonomous and active.
The MST invited old PCB militants like Lindolpho Silva to address its con-
gresses. Essential lessons came in the form of things to ignore. Theoretically,
the MST made a complete break with communism by rejecting modernist
ideas about the extinction of the peasantry. For the MST, the peasant was not
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an object but the subject-agent of change whose health and well-being could
be the salvation of Brazil. In contradistinction to orthodox Marxist ideology,
MST intellectuals argue that history does not determine the transformation of
peasants into rural proletarians. To the contrary, MST coordinators and
members see themselves as chief agents of the reverse process, turning rural
and urban proletarians into peasants. In practical terms, moreover, MST intel-
lectuals concluded that partisanship had compromised the rural labor move-
ments of the past, and it avoided becoming an appendage of any party, even
such an initially important ally as the PT. The male dominance of older orga-
nizations also seemed problematic to MST activists. Through the experience
of occupation, the landless movement had learned to appreciate the funda-
mental importance of women and children in sustaining the struggle, and the
MST opted to incorporate whole families whenever possible. But other com-
munist symbols and ideas inspired imitation. For several years, the MST
adopted the precoup motto of the PCB—“Land for those who work it.” The
MST flag is as crimson as any communist flag. A standard militant’s bibliog-
raphy features Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Ernesto (Che) Guevara. In
flags and literature the movement specifically linked itself to historic commu-
nists such as Lenin, Gramsci, Prestes, Mao, Castro, and Marighella (Stédile
and Fernandes, 1999: 31–56; Bogo, 1999; Fernandes, 2000).
According to the logic of the cold war, communists and communism were
a dying breed by the end of the 1980s and capitalist, neoliberal ideologies
were not only ascendant but verging on hegemonic. The history of the
Brazilian rural labor movement demonstrates the fallacy of these assump-
tions. Despite a cold war that included severe repression (coercion) as well
as ambitious incorporation schemes (consent), the capitalist ruling class
failed to establish hegemony in the Brazilian countryside. When the cold
war ended, the symbols and ideas of communism had a renewed vitality, and
communist activists, though no longer linked to Moscow, Beijing, or Havana,
were more influential than ever in the agrarian sector. This turn of events has
many meanings, most of them ironic. The outcome was nothing like that
envisioned by communists or anticommunists at the start of the cold war.
Despite the appeal of some ideas and individuals, Brazil’s communist par-
ties were in disarray as political forces linked to an international movement,
but so was the panacea of the liberal market economy offered by anticom-
munists. Brazil, along with many of the world’s nations and people, experi-
enced the cold war in much the way a ping-pong ball experiences novice
players. It would have been better not to play. In the Brazilian countryside,
hundreds of thousands of people continue to defy the rules of the game as
they utilize a hodge-podge of ideas to try to create the utopian future
promised by both capitalists and communists throughout the cold war.
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NOTE
1. The 1992 PCB congress voted to dissolve the PCB and reorganize as the Partido Popular
Socialista (Popular Socialist party—PPS) (http:// www.pps.com.br.) This alienated some members,
who were dismayed by the new party’s lack of revolutionary intent, and in 1996 they began a
campaign to resurrect the PCB (http://www.pcb.org.br/historia_N.html).
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